The pay of financial sector workers ("bankers") is a focus of public concern especially since the onset of the financial crisis. We document the remarkable rise in the share of aggregate pay going to those at the very top of the distribution over the last decade in the UK and highlight the role of the financial sector. Rising bonuses paid to bankers accounted for around two-thirds of the increase in the national wage bill ("earnings pie") taken by the top one percent of workers since 1999. Surprisingly, even after the crisis bankers took at least as large a share of the earnings pie in 2011 as they did at the peak of the boom in 2007 and saw no worsening in their employment outcomes relative to other similar workers. Having described the scale of bankers' pay, we discuss the policy responses that have been proposed to address the issue such as transparency, numerical bonus targets, bonus clawbacks and taxation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The financial crisis that began in the summer of 2007 focused public attention on the high pay levels of employees in the financial intermediation sector (henceforth, "bankers" 1 ). Even as some financial institutions collapsed and others were bailed-out or given wide-ranging taxpayer guarantees 2 , bankers seemed to be reaping enormous rewards and suffering very little of the downside costs. This is an area where there is much heat from moral outrage and insufficient attention to facts, so the main aim of this paper is to provide some objective evidence on the pay of bankers.
We begin by providing a historical context within which to view the recent evolution of income and wage inequality. The comprehensive work of Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) shows how the share of income going to those at the top of the distribution has accelerated, especially for the English-speaking nations, and reached levels last seen in the inter war period. For the UK, in the decade preceding 2007, the top percentile increased their share of total income by 3.4 percentage points to reach just over 15 percent of total income. Over half of this gain went to the top 0.1% of tax payers.
We document how changes at the top have been heavily skewed toward bankers by using non-top coded wage and income data from several sources that allow us to explore the sectoral distribution of gains across the entire distribution. Since 1999, somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the total income gain for those in the top 1% has gone to bankers, even though they account for only one-third of the top percentile of workers.
Furthermore, annual salaries have hardly changed for those in the top percentile over this 1 Strictly speaking, other than bankers this also includes workers in the fund management and insurance businesses. Obviously this includes many workers who are not in either retail or investment banking and work outside of the City of London. We discuss this in more detail later in the paper.
2 Haldane (2010) suggests that the cost of the UK and US bailouts is around 1% of GDP (£20bn in the British case).
period: their entire gain is due to increased bonuses. 3 Even more remarkably, while the crisis years have seen a fall in the share of income going to the top percentile, top bankers' pay had fully recovered by 2011 to the point at which they were taking slightly more of total income than they were before the crisis began. In spite of the turmoil, we show that the probability that workers in the financial sector remained in employment was the same as for workers in other sectors, although they were less likely to be working for the same firm. This is true for financial workers generally, not just those at the top of the wage distribution. If anything, we suspect we are now substantially underestimating the share of income at the top going to bankers. Examining pay disclosures on senior employees in banks that are now required to provide more extensive remuneration information suggests that around 60% of such pay is in forms that standard data sets would not capture (e.g. long-term equity incentive plans). 4 In terms of policy we begin by considering whether there is really any "problem" to be addressed. If bankers are paid in a competitive labour market and simply rewarded for their talent, there seems little reason for government intervention, at least on efficiency grounds.
However there seems to be substantial evidence of rents within the sector -a result of imperfect competition or arising from the implicit and explicit guarantees and subsidies that the sector receives from the government due to the "too big to fail" problem. We discuss various policy options that seek to either remove the basis for these rents or to tax them ex post. Finally, we note that on equity grounds, policy may seek to reduce the post-tax income taken by those in the upper echelons of the income distribution -which implicitly targets bankers given their prominence among high-earning workers. This has primarily taken the form of higher marginal tax rates. 3 In the ASHE data that we use in Section II, bonuses are defined as all payments made in cash during the year including profit sharing, productivity performance and other bonus or incentive pay, piecework and commission. It does not include share-based bonuses -see Section III for a discussion. 4 See Bell and Van Reenen (2012, 2013) for an analysis of the importance of these plans for CEOs.
While we document a strong rise in bankers' pay over the last decade and argue that at least some of this increased pay represents rents, there is a broader question as to whether other factors have contributed to a rising wage premium in finance. While a full discussion of such forces is outside the scope of this paper, we highlight two factors that are likely to be important. First, there has been a substantial rise in the capital available to bankers, which has then been magnified by increased leverage. For example, improved information technology, globalisation and increased firm size have meant that assets under management of a trader are far larger than 20 years ago. To the extent that such increases in capital can be managed with no additional workers, the model of Gabaix and Landier (2008) predicts a "scaling" effect that would increase wages. Second, Philippon and Reshef (2012) argue that the wave of deregulation that occurred in finance since the start of the 1980s enabled skilled workers in finance to operate freely and introduce new and complex financial products -which were profitable to the bank if not necessarily to society.
Finally, it is worth noting that both Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Kaplan and Rauh (2010) highlight that not all workers in the US financial sector witnessed substantial rises in pay. The gains have been primarily focused within investment banking, securities trading, hedge funds, private equity etc. Credit intermediation and Insurance have not seen the same kind of trends.
Our results for the UK are consistent with this finding, since the vast majority of bankers in the top percentile in our data are in the former type of firms
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section II we describe changes in the pay structure, in section III we remark on recent public disclosure of bankers pay, in section IV we discuss policy and section V concludes.
II. EXTREME WAGE INEQUALITY AND BANKERS

Long Run Income Inequality
It is well known that the UK distribution of income has widened considerably over the course of the last three decades. Figure 1 , the shares of the rich were broadly similar in the UK and US until the mid-1950s, after which the share of American rich flattened out whereas their share in the UK continued to fall. One key difference between the top percentile in the inter-war period and today is that the rich used to receive a substantial fraction of their income from investment returns, whereas today most of the income accruing to the top percentile comes in the form of wage income. For example, in 1937, 23% of the top percentiles income came from labour income whereas by 2000, this has risen to 65% (Atkinson, 2007) .
By disaggregating the top decile we can see how uneven the gains have been even within this high-earning group. 
Extreme Wage Inequality in the Last Decade
We now focus on the last decade where we have richer individual level data. Our main dataset is ASHE, the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (previously called the New Earnings Survey). ASHE is a random sample of 1% of employees based on the final two digits of an individual's National Insurance (same as US Social Security) number. All the data is provided by the employer direct from their payroll system and so is considered highly reliable. There is no top-coding of wage data, which is the key source of difficulty for most analysis of wage inequality at the top of the distribution (e.g. the US Current Population Survey). We examine two wage measures. First, the gross weekly wage is collected with reference to a specified survey week (always in April). This is the measure commonly used in analysis of wage inequality trends in the UK (see for example Machin and Van Reenen, 2010) and is consistently measured back to the early 1970s. However, a weekly wage misses any remuneration that is made at a lower frequency than the current pay period. In particular, incentive and bonus payments made in infrequent lump sums (e.g. a year-end bonus) will in general be missed. Since 1998, ASHE has also collected the gross annual wage. This measure is the total payment made to an employee over the proceeding twelve months and captures all cash bonus and incentive payments. We exclude all wage data affected by absence, and focus on full-time adult employees who have been in the same job at least 12 months.
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It is important to bear in mind the differences between such wage measures and the more comprehensive measures of income derived from tax data in Table 1 discussed above. First, the wage data exclude self-employment and investment income 7 . Second, the total wage bill measure we use only covers those in ASHE. Importantly, this generally excludes workers whose earnings are so low they pay no tax or national insurance. In contrast, the income share measures from the tax data are adjusted to include all those below the income tax threshold including those who are not working at all (e.g. unemployed, inactive and retired). 8 Thus we are likely to understate the share of total wages going to the top percentiles -and indeed the reported levels are lower than those in Atkinson et al (2011) . A full discussion of these issues is provided in the Web Appendix. Furthermore, the distribution of these gains was also completely different. Using weekly wages suggested that those in the 6 th to 10 th percentiles gained as much as the top percentile This is likely to be because the tax returns include some of the deferred incentive payments, not captured by annual bonuses (see the discussion below in Section III around Table 5 ). For example the growth of the share of the top decile was 3.6 percentage points in the tax returns compared with 3.3 percentage points in ASHE. 9 The gain of 3.3 percentage points from 1999-2008 compares with a gain of 3.6 percentage points from 1999-2008 using the income tax return shares given in Table 1 . So there is a very tight relationship between our measure of wage share changes using ASHE and the share changes using tax data over this period. Figure 2 plots the change in the share of the total wage bill going to the three groups over the period 1999-2008 using both weekly and annual wages and the top decile as a whole. The key point here is that the vast majority of the rise in the share of the top 1% over the last decade would be missed using weekly wages (0.4% vs. 1.8%) . In a labour market that increasingly uses incentive and bonus payments as part of the remuneration structure, weekly (and hourly) wages will increasingly fail to adequately capture the evolution of the wage structure. Again we see a small decline in the share of the wage bill accruing to the top decile in the wake of the crisis, though unwinding only a small share of the previous decade gains.
Sectoral Decomposition of Gains: The role of finance
How much of the rise in inequality can be accounted for by workers within the financial industry? The furore over bankers' pay has highlighted the high pay levels of bankers at grades well below the level of the CEO. But in contrast to CEO pay, none of this remuneration has been subject to required accounting disclosure. We can use the ASHE data to explore the sectoral decomposition of wage inequality changes. To maintain large enough samples and to comply with ONS confidentiality requirements associated with accessing the data, we focus on one-digit industry breakdowns. Fortunately, financial intermediation is consistently categorised over our sample period. Table 3 shows that workers in finance and business services (legal, accounting, management consultancy, IT services, etc.) have been the principal beneficiaries of increased inequality, while top earners in manufacturing have done least well. As we focus in on the top percentile workers, the increases between 1999 and 2008 are heavily focused on bankers. Over three quarters (1.4 out of 1.8 percentage points) of the increase in the top percentile's share of the UK wage bill went just to bankers. This is in spite of them only accounting for one-third of top percentile earners.
We also present complementary evidence from tax return micro data using the public use tapes of the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI). The SPI is a stratified random sample of all taxpayer filings in the UK, with sampling probabilities increasing up to 100% for those with very high incomes (see Web Appendix for details). The sample size in 2008 was over 500,000 records. We sample all taxpayers aged 18-65 who have annual pay above the PAYE threshold. Again we can identify the one-digit industry of employment. The bottom panel of Table 3 repeats the sectoral decomposition using this alternative data source and shows almost precisely the same picture as that using ASHE data -bankers were the main gainers within the top earners.
The Role of Bonuses in Extreme Wage Inequality
Bankers' bonuses have been a focus of public concern and regulatory activity. In Figure 3 we break down the annual wage data we have into salary and bonus component to provide some hard evidence on the importance of the latter for those at the top of the wage distribution. In 2008, 40% of all workers received at least part of their annual wage in a bonus. In the financial sector, this rises to 84%. However, although the receipt of bonuses is common for many workers, these bonuses typically account for only a small part of overall pay. For those outside the top decile, bonuses account for only 2.9% of total pay 10 . Even in the financial sector, only 8.6% of total pay for those outside the top decile is accounted for by bonuses. So for the average worker, bonuses are a small component of annual pay. In contrast, bonuses make up an important part of pay for those at the top of the wage distribution. Fully 83% of workers in the top percentile received a bonus and 35% of total pay for these workers came in the form of bonuses. The role of bonuses is even more substantial in the financial sector. Top percentile workers who are employed in finance received 44% of their total pay in bonuses.
The close link between rising wage inequality at the top and bonuses can be seen by calculating how much of the change in the share of wage income going to those at the top of the distribution has come in the form of bonuses. We can only do this calculation from 2002 as this is the first year that ASHE required the annual wage to be broken down into salary and bonus. From 2002 to 2008, the top percentile increased their share of the wage bill by 1.5
percentage points, from 7.4 to 8.9 percent. So most of the 1.8 percentage point gain observed
in Table 2 for the last decade actually occurred in this sub-period. 11 Remarkably, the entire gain to the top percentile was a result of increased bonus payments. Indeed, salaries for this group grew at a slower rate than for workers in the rest of the wage distribution. Of the 7.4 percent of the wage bill accruing to the top percentile in 2002, 5.5 percent was paid as salary and 1.9 percent was bonuses. By 2008, the figures were 4.9 percent and 4.0 percent respectively.
We are not, of course, claiming here that bonuses caused the increase in extreme wage inequality. But it is clear that the growth in bonuses that we have witnessed over the last decade, particularly for bankers, has gone hand in hand with a significant increase in the share of total wages taken by those at the top of the wage distribution. It is therefore unsurprising that bonuses have been such a source of contention.
The Impact of the Crisis on Bankers' Pay and Jobs
Has the financial crisis and subsequent weak recovery reversed the gains of the bankers? As we documented in wage decline as inflation rose 9.6% over the same period). For finance workers in London, the rise was 14.2%. 13 The share of finance workers in London in the total UK wage bill rose from 5.4% to 6.4% between 2008 and 2011 using this official data on full-time employees.
Are we are over-estimating the resilience of top bankers' pay by ignoring the employment 14 To examine this issue in more detail, we created a sample from the five-quarter longitudinal data of the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS surveys a large representative cross-section of the UK population and follows them for five quarters. Thus we can examine transitions percentile decline was 1.3 percentage points in ASHE. But the share then recovered by 0.8 percentage points by 2011 to give an overall decline of 0.5 percentage points. This suggests that the share of income recorded for the top percentile using income tax returns will bounce back when more recent years become available (as happened in the US data in 2010, see Figure 1 ). 13 It seems natural to focus on London financial sector workers when looking at the aggregate published statistics. For all workers in the top percentile of the wage distribution in 2011, 59% worked in London (compared with 16% of all workers). For those top-percentile workers in finance, 88% worked in London. 14 There have been numerous media reports of impending large-scale headcount reductions across major banks in London. Thus far, the official data do not reflect this. The most recent workforce jobs number (June 2012) actually shows a rise of 24,000 jobs in the financial sector in London since March 2011 -so the number of jobs is now higher than pre-crisis.
from employment over a 12-month period by comparing the first and fifth wave of data. We take all respondents who entered the LFS from the first quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2011 and have therefore completed their fifth-quarter interview. We then estimate equations of the following form on all workers who were employed in their first interview:
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where FINANCE is a dummy variable equal to unity if worker i was employed in finance and FINANCE*LONDON is a dummy variable equal to unity if worker i was employed in finance in London. The first outcome ( ,4 it y  ) we consider is whether the worker was still observed to be working 12-months later (Employed). We also consider whether the worker remained in the same firm or not (SameFirm).
, it X is a vector of other controls for age, education, occupation, industry, region, gender and public sector and i u is an error term. The LFS also provides information on gross weekly wages that allow us to estimate these equations for both the total workforce and for the upper part of the wage distribution. Table 4 reports estimates of the probability of being in various states conditional on being employed in the first interview (these are marginal effects from Probits). The first three columns focus on whether the worker is still in employment 12-months later, while the final three columns focus on whether the worker is with the same firm 12-months later. Our key coefficient variables of interest are the ' s  . It is clear from columns (1) and (2) The last three columns of Table 4 examine whether the worker is employed in the same firm.
Interestingly, column (5) suggests that financial sector workers outside London were significantly more likely to move jobs than both non-financial workers and financial workers in London. So although there is substantial job churning, this does not seem to have affected London finance workers more than comparable workers. And none of these differences are significant in column (6) which again focuses on the top 5% of wage earners. Overall the evidence is consistent with the aggregate employment picture -"City bankers" have not suffered exceptionally since the onset of the crisis.
III. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF BANKERS' PAY
We next provide a brief summary of some newly available pay data on bankers that suggests that the estimates in the previous section are likely to represent a lower bound on the importance of financial sector workers at the top of the distribution. The Financial Services 16 As an alternative, we re-ran Column (2) and included dummies for each five-percentage point range of the first-quarter wage distribution. The results are almost identical to those in Column (2).
Authority (FSA) introduced a new reporting requirement in 2010 for regulated financial entities in the UK. The rule requires a firm to identify all "code staff" whose professional activities are determined as having a material impact on the firm's risk profile. The firm must report the full aggregate remuneration of all such code staff, including deferred and equitybased compensation. This data provides a new glimpse into the world of bankers' pay and can provide some perspective on the likely underestimation that is involved by using ASHE data that cover only salary and cash bonus payments. Code staff are effectively in the top percentile of earners.
We have collected the 2010 disclosures for most significant banks that are either headquartered or have a reporting entity in London. Table 5 reports for each bank the number of code staff, the average salary, cash bonus, equity-based bonus and deferred bonus awards.
For comparison, we report the estimated salary and cash bonus in 2010 from ASHE for those
London bankers in the top 1% and 0.25% of the earnings distribution.
The disclosures cover 1,408 workers. The average salary of these workers is £283,000 and the annual cash bonus is an additional £285,000. So total cash compensation that should broadly match the ASHE definitions is £568,000. This suggests that code staff as a group are broadly in the top 0.25% of the wage distribution. But their total cash pay is far from the total compensation that these workers receive. The average equity award amounts to another £227,000, while deferred cash and equity bonuses make up another £237,000 and £873,000
respectively. 17 To the extent that such pay structures are more common in finance than in other sectors, we are undoubtedly under-estimating the share of top income accruing to finance workers. While data sources such as ASHE clearly miss the equity-based bonuses and 17 In general, deferred bonuses are primarily in the form of equity that must be held for around three years before vesting and are usually subject to future performance conditions. Exact details vary from firm to firm and are outlined in the FSA disclosures. Deferred bonuses are generally reported at face value which does not reflect the likelihood of vesting.
deferred compensation, tax return data should eventually capture such pay -provided it is structured in such a way as to generate an income tax liability rather than a capital gains tax liability. In any event, the use of such pay makes the analysis of year-to-year movements in bankers pay much more difficult and thus any attempt to examine the pay-performance link.
The similarity of the trends in Panel C (tax returns) and Panel B (ASHE Annual wages) of Table 2 is reassuring in this regard.
These disclosures also suggest that statisticians should be concerned with the paucity of data that currently exist on non-cash forms of pay. All the key micro datasets that labour economists use to examine wage behaviour -ASHE, Labour Force Survey, and British
Household Panel Survey (and also in general other countries data sources) -do not attempt to collect data on equity-based remuneration nor on deferred compensation. As such pay becomes more common, partly as a result of the policy responses we discuss below, the need for more comprehensive data becomes clear if one is concerned about what is happening at the top of the pay distribution.
Some have argued that greater transparency of pay will by itself help rectify the "problem" of the level and structure of bankers pay. There is little empirical evidence here, but we are sceptical that transparency by itself leads to declining pay rates or fewer bonuses. Indeed, Card, Mas, Moretti and Saez (2010) find that greater knowledge of pay structures leads to those in the lower half of the distribution feeling aggrieved and may lead to pressure for less well paid bankers to demand higher wages, further increasing the average pay in this sector.
IV. THE POLICY RESPONSE
Finally we turn to a discussion of policy. The starting point is whether there was in fact a problem to begin with. It may be that bankers' pay is simply the outcome of a competitive labour market in which the returns to talent are high and rising over time. The Rosen (1981) model of superstars provides one framework: sellers of a particular service e.g. traders at an investment bank, are not perfect substitutes. The purchaser of these services, the investment bank, will prefer to buy the services of the extraordinarily talented trader rather than one almost as good. Because only a few traders possess exceptional ability, investment banks will be willing to pay substantial premia for their services. The potential importance of such superstars in the financial sector is likely to have increased in recent years as a result of technological change. As markets have become more globalized and liquid, traders have witnessed a substantial rise in the number of different markets and asset types they can trade.
In addition, large increases in the size of assets under management allow for superstars to trade with much larger capital. This combination of superstars and an increasing asset base is at the heart of Gabaix and Landier (2008). In their model, CEOs differ in talent and are matched to firms competitively. If the marginal impact of a CEOs talent increases with the value of the firm under his control, the best CEO manages the biggest firm. Similarly, the best trader should work with the largest asset base. Crucially in their equilibrium, very small differences in talent can produce large differences in pay. In their calibration they show that the value of a firm increases by only 0.016% if they replace the 250 th best CEO with the best CEO. Yet these small differences in talent translate into large pay differences as they are magnified by firm size. The same calibration shows that the best CEO should be paid over five times more than the 250 th CEO.
An alternative explanation for the wage premia enjoyed by bankers focuses on the rents that accrue in the sector. These may come about as a result of lack of product market competition within the sector or as a result of implicit or explicit subsidies and guarantees that banks receive from the taxpayer. The much discussed "too-big-to-fail" problem is an example.
Governments will not allow systemically important financial institutions to fail and therefore they provide an implicit bailout guarantee. This guarantee is valuable to creditors and thus reduces the cost of finance for banks. Since shareholders have limited liability, the guarantee encourages risky lending financed by the cheaper finance -losses are limited on the downside and shareholders (and workers) benefit on the upside.
The first-best response to such market failures is to correct the failure and remove the ability to generate rents. The problems with such an approach should not be underestimated.
Suppose we focus on the "too-big-to-fail" issue. One response, made famous by Mervyn
King, is to argue that a bank that is too-big-to-fail is too big. Then a structural response of breaking up large banks to prevent them becoming systemically important seems called for.
But how do we define "too big"? And what is the trade-off between the social costs of the implicit guarantee and the efficiency gains that large banks can potentially achieve?
As an alternative to structural reforms of breaking up universal banks they could be divided into their retail and investment banking arms and required to hold separate capital for each arm. This is essentially one of the key recommendations of the "Vickers' Report" (formally the Independent Commission on Banking, ICB). The structural and regulatory reforms along the lines of those outlined by the ICB are likely to mitigate the market failures that give rise to rents in the sector, but are unlikely to remove such rents entirely. Indeed, the performance of the regulators during the last decade is unlikely to inspire confidence in their ability to overcome the entrenched interests at work in protecting the rents.
Thus while financial regulatory reform 18 is vital it is unlikely that policy-makers will be able and willing to commit to eliminate financial sector rents. Thus an alternative is to tax or regulate the outcomes. Here we consider three proposed policy responses. First, a tax on bank profits or revenues. Such a tax has been introduced in a number of EU countries and was implemented as a Bank Levy in the UK in Budget 2010. All UK banks and building societies and foreign banks operating through permanent UK subsidiaries are required to pay an annual tax rate of 0.105% on their total balance sheet. The tax rate is set so that the total expected tax revenue is equal to £2.5 billion. In addition "safer" forms of funding are either excluded from the balance sheet calculation or taxed at a half-rate to encourage their use over risky funding (Devereux, 2011) . Larger firms will pay more under such a tax and this at least goes some way to capture the implicit cost of the guarantees, but in practice the link between systemic risk and balance sheet size is likely to be complex. It is also unclear why such a levy is preferable to a tax on economic rent in the banking sector. Such a tax could be implemented as a surcharge rate on the regular corporation tax rate, rather like that applied to the oil industry. Alternatively, the International Monetary Fund (2010) has proposed a Financial Activities Tax, which would approximate a tax on rents but in addition impose a further tax on high remuneration.
Second, consider a tax on the pool of money used to pay bankers bonuses. The Labour Government pursued this policy in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis.
Announced in the 2009 Pre-Budget Report, employers were subject to a 50% tax rate for any bonus paid to bankers in excess of £25,000 in the 2009/10 tax year. The bonus tax was explicitly declared as a one-off tax -though the Labour Party (now in Opposition) is in favour of repeating the exercise. At the time, the Treasury predicted the tax would raise £550 million. In fact, the tax seemed to generate revenue of some £2.3 billion. The key reason for the higher tax take seems to have been that firms accepted the one-off nature of the tax and absorbed the cost of the tax across their global wage bill rather than reduce the payments to their UK-based workers. Whether such shifting would occur if the tax were viewed as permanent is less clear. In addition, taxing only one component of pay would surely encourage employers to re-classify pay in ways that avoided the tax.
Third, there has been much attention paid to altering the structure of banker's remuneration.
This approach does not explicitly seek to affect the size of pay and thus does not seem to directly affect the sharing out of rents. However, it may be argued that the combination of the moral hazard problem that banks have implicit and explicit guarantees that protect the downside (the too-big-to-fail problem) and the standard principal-agent problems of management and shareholders may have resulted in the provision of high-powered incentives to workers that do not induce the socially optimal level of risk-taking on the part of workers.
Workers paid bonuses on the basis of the annual profits of their trading book have an incentive to search for short-term profit and to increase the risk they take at the expense of the long-term interest of the firm. These effects become magnified during a period in which the low interest rates of the major central banks encouraged excessive risk-taking and leverage. This is particularly so for traders who make money in aggregate only by luck and have no ability to outperform the market in the long run. The worst that can happen to such traders is that they lose their job, but they keep the bonuses they had previously received. The management of the firm is less incentivised to address these issues since the moral hazard problem reduces the downside costs of such actions. Thus the focus on pay structures seeks to address these negative incentive effects and align the workers objective with those of the long-run interests of the firm.
Besley and Ghatak (2013) examine a model where there is state insurance for the financial sector on the downside and principal agent problems in banking. They show that in equilibrium there will be excessive incentives for risk taking and consider optimal policy responses over financial sector pay. They further prove that a combination of regulation of the structure of bonuses and a tax on their level emerges as the optimal policy in such a set-up. The key components of a compliant pay policy are as follows:
 A substantial fraction of pay must be in variable form that is fully flexible, allowing for decreases when performance is poor.
 Between 40-60% of variable remuneration must be deferred with a minimum deferral period of 3 years. Institutions should have mechanisms to claw-back deferred remuneration in the light of poor performance.
 At least 50% of variable remuneration should be in shares or other non-cash instruments.
 Guaranteed bonuses should be exceptional and limited to the first year of employment.
 Employees must not undertake hedging activities to undermine the risk alignment effect.
It is too early to judge the effectiveness of such regulations, and indeed given the paucity of data it is hard to see how success would be measured. Nevertheless, the considerations discussed above suggest that if successfully enforced this could be broadly a sensible policy response.
The above overview of policy responses is focused on whether and how to correct failures specific to the banking sector that generate large income gains for workers in the sector.
However more generally, policymakers may wish to focus on the equity aspect of the general increase in inequality. This leads naturally to a focus on all those at the top of the income distribution. Since bankers are a disproportionate share of such workers (and are disproportionately well-paid within this extreme), any such policy would have the implicit effect of targeting bankers. The key response on this dimension was been the introduction of a new 50% marginal income tax rate in April 2010 on all income over £150,000. This cut-off is almost identical to the top percentile entry point and thus the policy was squarely focused on the top 1%. The rate will be reduced to 45% in April 2013 following a review of the operation of the new 50% rate by HMRC (2012). In announcing the rate reduction, the Chancellor concluded that the higher rate introduced "massive distortions" and may raise no more than a 45% rate. Oddly, one of the key findings of the HMRC report is that around £16 billion of income was brought forward to avoid the new 50% rate. Since this cannot happen repeatedly, it is not clear why this provides any important evidence on whether the 50% rate should be reduced. In reality, the revenue-maximising marginal rate estimated from most models has large standard errors that do not allow for confident assertion on the appropriate marginal tax rate (see Mirrlees et al (2011) and Saez (2012) for an extensive discussion).
Having said that, there is some evidence to suggest that there is a link between the top marginal tax rate and the share of total income going to the top percentile. Piketty, Saez and Stantcheva (2011) examine time-series evidence across 18 OECD countries and show that there is a strong negative correlation between changes in top marginal tax rates and changes in the top percentile income share since 1960 (see Figure 4) . They interpret this correlation as supporting the hypothesis that the returns to investing in "compensation bargaining" rise as the top rate falls i.e. since workers keep more of the bargained wage after tax, the incentives to bargain harder will rise. This suggests that the optimal top tax rate is higher than in models that focus primarily on the standard labour supply response.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Occupy movement brought a new saliency to the issue of income inequality. Their key slogan -"we are the 99%" -dramatically highlighted the sense that a small elite have been the main winners in the decades leading up to the crisis (e.g. Stiglitz, 2012) . Top percentile workers have substantially increased their share of the income pie -in the 1970s they took around 6% of total UK income but by the end of the 2000s, this had risen to 15%. On this measure, we returned to levels of inequality not seen since the Inter-war years. But one key difference is that the high-income group used to be the rentier-class enjoying returns on their fixed capital. Now, the high-income group are primarily high-wage workers enjoying returns on human capital.
Among these high-wage workers in the UK, bankers feature heavily. In 2008, 28 percent of all top percentile earners in the UK were London bankers. But this dramatically understates their importance in the rise in overall wage inequality during the last decade. We estimate that somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the overall increase in the share of wages taken by those in the top percentile have accrued to bankers. More remarkably, the financial crisis seems to have been so far little more than a blip for the pay of bankers. If we focus on all those workers in the top percentile, their average wage rose from £277,800 in 2008 to £284,100 in 2011, a rise of 2.3% and their share of the overall wage bill fell, as the mean wage for all workers rose by 3.7%. In contrast, the bankers in the top percentile saw their average wage rise from £325,100 to £353,100, a gain of 8.6%.
How should policy respond to these facts? From an efficiency perspective, the key question is the extent to which bankers pay arises from financial sector rents. To the extent that it does, regulatory and structural reforms to remove or lessen the ability to generate such rents are called for. We are sceptical however, that such reforms will be wholly successful, which suggests that policy will also need to focus on taxing the rents themselves -either before or after they are paid out to bankers. From an equity perspective, the remarkable gains to those at the top of the income distribution over the last few decades, may call for higher marginal income taxes. The appropriate level at which to set such tax rates remains a matter of intense political and economic debate. 
Notes:
The coefficients are marginal effects and robust standard errors from a probit regression where we condition on being employed in quarter-one and track the same individuals in quarter-five. Employed = 1 if the individual was still employed in quarter-five and zero otherwise. Same Firm = 1 if individual was in same firm in quarter-five and zero otherwise. Finance is a dummy equal to one if the worker was employed in financial intermediation in quarter-one and Finance*London is a dummy equal to one if the worker was employed in financial intermediation in London in quarter-one. Full controls include a set of age, quarter-of-interview, gender, marital status, public sector, education, job tenure, region, and one-digit industry and occupation dummies. Data are from the five-quarter LFS longitudinal survey, Jan 2008-Mar 2011.
WEB APPENDIX: NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLCIATION DIFFERENCES IN MEASUREMENT OF INCOME AND EARNINGS ACROSS ALTERNATIVE DATA SOURCES TOP INCOMES DATABASE
The Top Incomes Database (TID) (http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/) provides data on income shares across a range of countries and time periods. Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010) and Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) provide extensive discussion of the data.
The UK data we use in this paper from TID are derived from HMRC publications based on the Survey of Personal Incomes (see below). The data relate to all forms of taxable income and so in addition to wage and salary income also include self-employment profits, rental income and investment income. HMRC provide income distribution tables for all taxpayers. Two key adjustments are then made to the tax data to generate the denominator of total income. First, the tax data relate to taxpayers rather than to the entire adult population. In 2009 for example, there were 30.6 million taxpayers but 51.0 million adults. Second, the tax data does not report all forms of income nor does it cover those adults not liable for tax. There are two methods of dealing with this missing income. First, one can begin with the total taxable income figure (£869 billion in 2009) and add estimates for the non-taxpaying population and any missing form of income. Alternatively, one can begin with the total income of households recorded in the National Accounts (Blue Book 2011, Table 6 .1.4, ONS Code QWMJ) and subtract various items. Following the second method gives a total income figure of £955 billion. This is then the denominator. The numerator for a particular top percentile group is then simply the total income accruing to the appropriate number of taxpayers from the HMRC data. Thus for example, to compute the share of income going to the top percentile in 2009, we simply compute the income total for the highest earning 0.51 million taxpayers and divide by the total income figure of £955 billion. As shown in Table 1 , this amounted to 13.9% in 2009. This procedure follows Atkinson et al (2011) .
ANNUAL SURVEY OF HOURS AND EARNINGS (ASHE)
ASHE is based on a 1% sample of employee jobs taken from HMRC PAYE records. The sample is based on an individual's National Insurance number and so forms an unbalanced panel of workers. Self-employed workers are excluded (as they are not in the PAYE system) as are workers below the PAYE threshold (though some attempt is made to include low-paid and short-hours workers with additional supplementary samples). The data is provided directly by employers and covers both weekly and annual wages.
In calculating wage shares for this paper, it is important to recognise that we are computing a different metric than the income shares reported in the TID. To compute a wage share in ASHE, we take all wages in ASHE to generate the wage-bill total. We are therefore explicitly excluding the wages of those who fall below the PAYE threshold and the earnings of the self-employed as neither are covered by ASHE. We make no attempt to estimate the wage-bill of these omitted workers. More precisely therefore, the ASHE wage share calculations in the paper are shares of the total employee wage-bill for those workers earning above the PAYE threshold. In contrast, the TID calculations add in those below the threshold and estimate their income.
SURVEY OF PERSONAL INCOMES (SPI)
The SPI is based on information held by HMRC tax offices on individuals who could be liable to UK tax. The survey is conducted annually and provides the basis for the data used in the TID. For the purposes of Table 3 in the paper, we use the public-use versions of the SPI data made available by the UK Data Archive from 1996-2008. The SPI randomly samples from individual tax records with sampling probabilities rising as income increases. The data contains weights to allow for the computation of statistics covering the entire taxpayer population. The most recent SPI (2008) contains 595,742 valid cases. The data provides the most comprehensive and accurate official source of data on personal incomes for all those taxpayers above the PAYE threshold (£5,225 in 2007/8). However HMRC does not record comprehensive information on those earning below this threshold as they are not liable for tax. Thus the SPI sample is broadly similar in scope to those captured in ASHE, except that the SPI also includes the self-employed.
The data provides a detailed breakdown of total taxable income, identifying income from employment (both employee and self-employed), rental income and all forms of investment income. It provides basic demographic information including sex, age, industry, retirement status and region. We sample all non-retired adults aged 18-65.
Aggregated Records in SPI
To maintain taxpayer confidentiality, individual records are aggregated for those on extremely high incomes. In the 2008 survey, the cut-off point for aggregation was £600,000 in total income. Aggregate records are produced by combining individuals above this threshold according to various personal characteristics. In 2008, there were 104 aggregated records, representing 3,130 cases. For each aggregated record, the mean cell value of each variable is reported. In addition, the documentation gives a breakdown of the distribution of region and industry within the cell. We can use this latter information to approximate the sectoral distribution within the aggregated cell. The following example illustrates our method: We replace the aggregated record with 20 individual records each with a total taxable income equal to the cell mean (and weights equal to 1/20 th of the aggregated record). We allocate industry codes to these individual records to match the distribution in the underlying cases. The key assumption is that the distribution of total taxable income within the aggregated cell is independent of industry distribution. If instead, for example, the financial intermediation workers were all in the top half of the £1,350,000 -£1,400,000 income range, then we would underestimate their share of total income. Given the evidence from ASHE on the distribution of earnings at the very top, we suspect we are being conservative on the share of income accruing to financial sector workers by assuming independence.
